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DUAL LABOR MARKETS 
1 A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation 
A growing body of empirical research 
has documented persistent divisions 
among American workers: divisions by 
race, sex, educational credentials, industry 
grouping, and so forth (F. B. Weisskoff, 
B. Bluestone, S. Bowles and H. Gintis, 
D. Gordon, 1971 and 1972, B. Harrison, 
M. Reich, H. Wachtel and C. Betsey, 
and H. Zellner). These groups seem to 
operate in different labor markets, with 
different working conditions, different 
promotional opportunities, different 
wages, and different market institutions. 
These continuing labor market divisions 
pose anomalies for neoclassical economists. 
Orthodox theory assumes that profit- 
maximizing employers evaluate workers 
in terms of their individual characteristics 
and predicts that labor market differences 
among groups will decline over time be- 
cause of competitive mechanisms (K. 
Arrow). But by most measures, the labor 
market differences among groups have 
not been disappearing (R. Edwards, M. 
Reich, and T.  Weisskopf, chs. 5, 7, 8). 
The continuing importance of groups in 
the labor market thus is neither ex- 
plained nor predicted by orthodox theory. 
Why is the labor force in general still 
~ 
so fragmented? Why are group charac- 
teristics repeatedly so important in the 
I labor market? In  this paper, we sum- 
marize an emerging radical theory of labor 
market segmentation; we develop the 
full arguments in Reich, Gordon, and 
Edwards. The theory argues that political 
and economic forces within American 
capitalism have given rise to and per- 
petuated segmented labor markets, and 
that i t  is incorrect to view the sources of 
segmented markets as exogenous to the 
economic system. 
Present Labor Market Segmentation 
We define labor market segmentation 
as the historical process whereby political- 
economic forces encourage the division of 
the labor market into separate submarkets, 
or segments, distinguished by different 
labor market characteristics and be- 
havioral rules. Segmented labor markets 
are thus the outcome of a segmentation 
process. Segments may cut horizontally 
across the occupational hierarchy as well 
as vertically. We suggest that present 
labor market conditions can most usefully 
be understood as the outcome of four seg- 
mentation processes. 
1. Segmentation into Primary 
and Secondary Markets 
The primary and secondary segments, 
to use the terminology of dual labor 
market theory, are differentiated mainly 
by stability characteristics. Primary jobs 
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are low; turnover is high; and job ladders 
are few. Secondary jobs are mainly 
(though not exclusively) filled by minority 
workers, women, and youth. 
2. Segmentation Within the 
Primary Sector 
Within the primary sector we see a seg- 
mentation between what we call "sub- 
ordinate" and "independent" primary 
jobs. Subordinate primary jobs are rou- 
tinized and encourage personality char- 
acteristics of dependability, discipline, 
responsiveness to rules and authority, and 
acceptance of a firm's goals. Both factory 
and office jobs are present in this segment. 
I n  contrast, independent primary jobs en- 
courage and require creative, problem- 
solving, self-initiating characteristics and 
of ten have professional standards for 
work. Voluntary turnover is high and in- 
dividual motivation and achievement are 
highly rewarded. 
3. Segmentation by Race 
While minority workers are present in 
secondary, subordinate primary and in- 
dependent primary segments they often 
face distinct segments within those sub- 
markets. Certain jobs are "race-typed," 
segregated by prejudice and by labor 
market institutions. Geographic separa- 
tion plays an important role in maintain- 
ing divisions between race segments. 
4. Segmentation by Sex 
Certain jobs have generally been re- 
stricted to men; others to women. Wages 
in the female segment are usually lower 
than in comparable male jobs; female jobs 
often require and encourage a "serving 
mentalityv-an orientation toward pro- 
viding services to other people and par- 
ticularly to men. These characteristics are 
encouraged by family and schooling in- 
stitutions. 
The Historical Origins of Labor 
Market Segmentation 
The present divisions of the labor 
market are best understood from an his- 
torical analysis of their origins. We argue 
that segmentation arose during the transi- 
tion from competitive to monopoly cap- 
italism. Our historical analysis focuses on 
the era of monopoly capitalism, from 
roughly 1890 to the present, with special 
emphasis on the earlier transitional years. 
During the preceding period of com- 
petitive capitalism, labor market develop- 
ments pointed toward the progressive 
homogenizatiorc of the labor force, not 
toward segmentation. The factory system 
eliminated many skilled craft occupations, 
creating large pools of semiskilled jobs 
(N. Ware). Production for a mass market 
and increased mechanization forged stan- 
dardized work requirements. Large es- 
tablishments drew greater numbers of 
workers into common working environ- 
ments. 
The increasingly homogeneous and pro- 
letarian character of the work force gen- 
erated tensions which were manifest in 
the tremendous upsurge in labor conflict 
that accompanied the emergence of mo- 
nopoly capitalism: in railroads dating 
back to 1877, in steel before 1901 and 
again in 1919, in coal mining during and 
after the First World War, in textile mills 
throughout this period, and in countless 
other plants and industries around the 
country. The success of the Industrial 
Workers of the World ( IWW) ,  the emer- I 
gence of a strong Socialist party, the I 
general (as opposed to industry-specific) 1 
strikes in Seattle and New Orleans, the 
mass labor revolts in 1919 and 1920, and 
the increasingly national character of the 
labor movement throughout this period 
indicated a widespread and growing op- 
position to capitalist hegemony in general. 
More and more, strikes begun "simply" 
over wage issues often escalated to much 
~ 
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more general issues (J. Brecher, J. 
Commons). 
At the same time that the work force 
was becoming more homogeneous, those 
oligopolistic corporations that still dom- 
inate the economy today began to emerge 
and to consolidate their power. The cap- 
tains of the new monopoly capitalist era, 
now released from short-run competitive 
pressures and in search of long-run stabil- 
ity, turned to the capture of strategic 
control over product and factor markets. 
Their new concerns were the creation and 
exploitation of monopolistic control, rather 
than the allocational calculus of short-run 
profit-maximization. (For examples see 
A. Chandler, B. Emmet and J. Jeuck, R. 
Hidy and M. Hidy, and A. Nevins.) 
The new needs of monopoly capitalism 
for control were threatened by the con- 
sequences of homogenization and pro- 
letarianization of the work force. Evidence 
abounds that large corporations were 
painfully aware of the potentially revolu- 
tionary character of these movements. As 
Commons notes, the employers' "mass 
offensive'' on unions between 1903 and 
1908 was more of an ideological crusade 
than a matter of specific demands. The 
simultaneous formation of the National 
Civic Federation (NCF), a group dom- 
inated by large "progressive" capitalists, 
was another explicit manifestation of the 
fundamental crises facing the capitalist 
class (J. Weinstein). The historical anal- 
ysis which follows suggests that to meet 
this threat employers actively and con- 
sciously fostered labor market segmenta- 
Monopoly capitalist corporations de- 
vised deliberate strategies to resolve the 
contradictions between the increased pro- 
letarianization of the work force and the 
growth and consolidation of concentrated 
corporate power. The central thrust of 
the new strategies was to break down the 
increasingly unified worker interests that 
grew out of the proletarianization of work 
and the concentration of workers in urban 
areas. As exhibited in several aspects of 
these large firms' operations, this effort 
aimed to divide the labor force into various 
segments so that the actual experiences of 
workers were different and the basis of 
their common opposition to capitalists 
undermined. 
The first element in the new strategy in- 
volved the internal relations of the firm. 
The tremendous growth in the size of 
monopoly capitalist work forces, along 
with the demise of craft-governed pro- 
duction, necessitated a change in the 
authority relations upon which control in 
the firm rested (R. Edwards). Efforts 
toward change in this area included 
Taylorism and Scientific Management, the 
establishment of personnel departments, 
experimentation with different organiza- 
tional structures, the use of industrial 
psychologists, "human relations experts" 
l tion in order to "divide and conquer" 
the labor force. Moreover, the efforts of 
monopolistic corporations to gain greater 
control of their product markets led to a 
dichotomization of the industrial struc- 
ture which had the indirect and unin- 
We have paid more attention in this brief summary 
to employers' conscious efforts because the other papers 
presented in this session provide a complementary em- 
phasis on systemic forces. We fully develop both ex- 
planations in Reich, Gordon, and Edwards. 
These efforts were "conscious" in the following 
sense. Capitalists faced immediate problems and events 
and devised strategies to meet them. Successful strate- 
gies survived and were copied. These efforts were not 
"conscious" in the sense that those who undertook them 
tended, though not undesired, effect of understood fully the historical forces acting upon them 
or all the ramifications of their policies. As we argue in 
reinforcing their conscious strategies. Thus the text, in certain cases capitalists acted out of a 
labor market segmentation arose both broader class consciousness. 
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and others to devise appropriate "mo- 
tivating" incentives, and so forth (L. 
Baritz, A. Chandler, S. Marglin and F. 
Miller and M. Coghill). From this effort 
emerged the intensification of hierarchical 
control, particularly the "bureaucratic 
form" of modern corporations. In  the 
steel industry, for example, a whole new 
system of stratified jobs was introduced 
shortly after the formation of U.S. Steel 
(K. Stone). The effect of bureaucratiza- 
tion was to establish a rigidly graded 
hierarchy of jobs and power by which 
"top-down" authority could be exercised. 
The restructuring of the internal rela- 
tions of the firm furthered labor market 
segmentation through the creation of seg- 
mented "internal labor markets." Job 
ladders were created, with definite "entry- 
level" jobs and patterns of promotion. 
White-collar workers entered the firm's 
work force and were promoted within i t  in 
different ways from the blue-collar pro- 
duction force. Workers not having the 
qualifications for particular entry-level 
jobs were excluded from access to that en- 
tire job ladder. In response, unions often 
sought to gain freedom from the arbitrary 
discretionary power of supervisors by de- 
manding a seniority criterion for promo- 
tion. In  such cases, the union essentially 
took over the management of the internal 
labor markets: they agreed to allocate 
workers and discipline recalcitrants, help- 
ing legitimize the internal market in re- 
turn for a degree of control over its opera- 
tion (P. Doeringer and M. Piore). 
One such effort a t  internal control 
eventually resulted in segmentation by 
industry. Firms had initially attempted to 
raise the cost to workers of leaving in- 
dividual companies (but not the cost of 
entering) by restricting certain benefits 
to continued employment in that com- 
pany. Part of this strategy was "welfare 
capitalism" which emerged from the NCF 
in particular, and achieved most pro- 
nounced form in the advanced industries. 
At Ford, for example, education for the 
workers' children, credit, and other bene- 
fits were dependent on the workers' con- 
tinued employment by the firm and there- 
fore tied the worker more securely to the 
firm. For these workers, the loss of one's 
job meant a complete disruption in all 
aspects of the family's life. Likewise, 
seniority benefits were lost when workers 
switched companies (Weinstein). As in- 
dustrial unions gained power, they trans- 
formed some of these firm-specific benefits 
to industry-wide privileges. The net effect 
was an intensification not only of internal 
segmentation, but also of segmentation by 
industry, which, as we discuss in the next 
section, had other origins as well. 
At the same time that firms were seg- 
menting their internal labor markets, sim- 
ilar efforts were under way with respect 
to the firm's external relations. Employers 
quite consciously exploited race, ethnic, 
and sex antagonisms in order to undercut 
unionism and break strikes. I n  numerous 
instances during the consolidation of 
monopoly capitalism, employers manipu- 
lated the mechanisms of labor supply in 
order to import blacks as strikebreakers, 
and racial hostility was stirred up to de- 
flect class conflicts into race conflicts. For 
example, during the steel strike of 1919, 
one of the critical points in U.S. history, 
some 30,000 to 40,000 blacks were im- 
ported as strikebreakers in a matter of a 
few weeks. Employers also often trans- 
formed jobs into "female jobs" in order to 
render those jobs less susceptible to 
unionization (Brecher, D. Brody, Com- 
mons). 
Employers also consciously manipulated 
ethnic antagonisms to achieve segmenta- 
tion. Employers often hired groups from 
rival nationalities in the same plant or in 
different plants. During labor unrest the 
companies sent spies and rumor mongers 
to each camp, stirring up fears, hatred, 
I 
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and antagonisms of other groups. The emergence of a monopolistic core in the 
strategy was most successful when many economy sharply accentuated some sys- 
immigrant groups had little command of temic market forces that stimulated and 
English (Brecher, Brody) . reinforced segmentation. As different firms 
The manipulation of ethnic differences and industries grew a t  different rates, a 
was, however, subject to two grave limita- dichotomization of industrial structure de- 
tions as a tool in the strategy of "divide veloped (R. Averitt, T.  Vietorisz and B. 
and conquer." First, increasing English Harrison, and J. OIConnor). The larger, 
literacy among immigrants allowed them more capi tal-in tensive firms were generally 
to communicate more directly with each sheltered by barriers to entry, enjoyed 
other; second, mass immigration ended in technological, market power, and financial 
1924. Corporations then looked to other economies of scale and generated higher 
segmentations of more lasting significance. rates of profit and growth than their 
Employers also tried to weaken the smaller, labor-intensive competitive coun- 
union movement by favoring the conserva- terparts. However, i t  did not turn out 
tive "business-oriented" craft unions that the monopolistic core firms were 
against the newer "social-oriented" in- wholly to swallow up the competitive 
dustrial unions. An ideology of corporate periphery firms. 
liberalism toward labor was articulated Given their large capital investments, 
around the turn of the century in the the large monopolistic corporations re- 
NCF. Corporate liberalism recognized quired stable market demand and stable 
the potential gains of legitimizing some planning horizons in order to insure that 
unions but not others; the NCF worked their investments would not go unutilized 
jointly with the craft-dominated American (J. K. Galbraith). Where demand was 
Federation of Labor to undermine the cyclical, seasonal, or otherwise unstable, 
more militant industrial unions, the So- production within the monopolistic en- 
cialist party, and the I W W  (Weinstein). vironment became increasingly unsuit- 
As the period progressed, employers able. More and more, production of cer- 
also turned to a relatively new divisive tain products was subcontracted or "ex- 
means, the use of educational "creden- ported" to small, more competitive and 
tials." For the first time, educational less capital-intensive firms on the indus- 
credentials were used to regularize skill re- trial periphery. 
quirements for jobs. Employers played an Along with the dualism in the indus- 
active role in molding educational institu- trial structure, there developed a corre- 
tions to serve these channeling functions. sponding dualism of working environ- 
The new requirements helped maintain ments, wages, and mobility patterns. 
the somewhat artificial distinctions be- Monopoly corporations, with more stable 
tween factory workers and those in production and sales, developed job struc- 1 routinized office jobs and helped generate tures and internal relations reflecting that , some strong divisions within the office be- stability. For example, the bureaucratiza- tween semiskilled white-collar workers tion of work rewarded and elicited stable and their more highly skilled office mates work habits in employees. In  peripheral 
(Bowles, Bowles and Gintis, Cohen and firms, where product demand was un- 
Lazerson and Edwards). stable, jobs and workers tended to be 
marked also by instability. The result was 
Systemic Forces the dichotomization of the urban labor 
The rise of giant corporations and the market into "primary" and "secondary" 
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sectors, as  the dual labor market theory 
has proposed (Gordon, 1972, Piore). 
I n  addition, certain systemic forces in- 
tensified segmentation within corpora- 
tions in the primary sector. As Piore has 
argued, the evolution of technology within 
primary work places tended to promote 
distinctions between jobs requiring gen- 
eral and specific skills. As new tech- 
nologies emerged which replicated these 
differential skill requirements, employers 
found that  they could most easily train 
for particular jobs those workers who had 
already developed those different kinds 
of skills. As highly technical jobs evolved 
in which the application of generalized, 
problem-solving techniques were required, 
for instance, employers found that  they 
could get the most out of those who had 
already developed those traits. Initial 
differences in productive capacities were 
inevitably reinforced. 
The Social Functions of 
Labor Market Segmentation 
As the preceding historical analysis has 
argued, labor market segmentation is 
intimately related to the dynamics of 
monopoly capitalism. Understanding its 
origins, we are now in a position to assess 
its social importance. 
Labor market segmentation arose and 
is perpetuated because i t  is functional- 
that  is, i t  facilitates the operation of 
capitalist institutions. Segmentation is 
functional primarily because i t  helps re- 
produce capitalist hegemony. First, as  the 
historical analysis makes quite clear, 
segmentation divides workers and fore- 
stalls potential movements uniting all 
workers against employers. (For an in- 
teresting analysis, see C. Kerr and A. 
Siegel) . Second, segmentation establishes 
"fire trails" across vertical job ladders 
and, to the extent that  workers perceive 
separate segments with different criteria 
for access, workers limit their own as- 
pirations for mobility. Less pressure is 
then placed on other social institutions- 
the schools and the family, for example- 
that reproduce the class structure. Third, 
division of workers into segments legi- 
timizes inequalities in authority and con- 
trol between superiors and subordinates. 
For example, institutional sexism and 
racism reinforce the industrial authority 
of white male foremen. 
Political Implications 
One of the principal barriers to united 
anticapitalist opposition among workers 
has been the evolution and persistence of 
labor market segmentation. This seg- 
mentation underlies the current state of 
variegation in class consciousness among 
different groups of workers. A better un- 
derstanding of the endogenous sources of 
uneven levels of consciousness helps to 
explain the difficulties involved in over- 
coming divisions among workers. None- 
theless, if we more clearly understand the 
sources of our divisions, we may be able 
to see more clearly how to overcome them. 
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